First, no, not all science is empirical. You can’t empirically test historical hypotheses, and some psychological ot sociological theses would be very much immoral to test.
Second, whether we accept some results (or any other information) as “knowledge” is an epistemological issue: What do we classify as knowledge? When can we be sure that it’s not just an assumption sustained by bias? What burden of proof applies where? Can some assumption be useful even if it doesn’t rise to the level of knowledge (yet)?
Third, the post says “I believe science”, meaning: I trust their results. That is a subjective thing and beyond any empirical or epistemological scope. No matter how sure you may be that a given thesis is knowledge rather than just speculation, whether someone else shares that conviction is a separate question not fully dependent on yours.
You can call that ignorance, but that doesn’t make a difference either way: If I don’t believe you in the first place, calling me ignorant doesn’t have any more weight either.
Hence: “I believe that science confers knowledge” is a valid assertion and fundamental premise for working with scientific results in the first place. Whether or not you’d phrase it that way, “Science is not a matter of belief” is a matter of belief too.
That said, I believe in the importance of tempering assumptions with evidence, empirical or otherwise, in order to constantly test and refine our understanding of the patterns and principles that govern the physical world and our social behaviour within it. I believe that we may not have all the answers, that some things may be fundamentally unanswerable, and that raising assumptions to the level of fundamental truths (like beliefs about the afterlife) is intellectually dishonest. I believe that it is better to say “We don’t know” when that is true, and that we should acknowledge this limit to our knowledge (which doesn’t mean we shouldn’t strive to push it).
First, no, not all science is empirical. You can’t empirically test historical hypotheses, and some psychological ot sociological theses would be very much immoral to test.
Second, whether we accept some results (or any other information) as “knowledge” is an epistemological issue: What do we classify as knowledge? When can we be sure that it’s not just an assumption sustained by bias? What burden of proof applies where? Can some assumption be useful even if it doesn’t rise to the level of knowledge (yet)?
Third, the post says “I believe science”, meaning: I trust their results. That is a subjective thing and beyond any empirical or epistemological scope. No matter how sure you may be that a given thesis is knowledge rather than just speculation, whether someone else shares that conviction is a separate question not fully dependent on yours.
You can call that ignorance, but that doesn’t make a difference either way: If I don’t believe you in the first place, calling me ignorant doesn’t have any more weight either.
Hence: “I believe that science confers knowledge” is a valid assertion and fundamental premise for working with scientific results in the first place. Whether or not you’d phrase it that way, “Science is not a matter of belief” is a matter of belief too.
That said, I believe in the importance of tempering assumptions with evidence, empirical or otherwise, in order to constantly test and refine our understanding of the patterns and principles that govern the physical world and our social behaviour within it. I believe that we may not have all the answers, that some things may be fundamentally unanswerable, and that raising assumptions to the level of fundamental truths (like beliefs about the afterlife) is intellectually dishonest. I believe that it is better to say “We don’t know” when that is true, and that we should acknowledge this limit to our knowledge (which doesn’t mean we shouldn’t strive to push it).
In short: I believe in science.