So, I’ve been using keepassxc for some time now, but I wanted a viable alternative for command line usage (there is keepassxc-cli, that I use, but it is really a pain in the ass). So, I searched and found pass and gopass.
However, I’ve seen that they store each entry in a gpg encrypted file, inside a plain directory hierarchy. And, don’t get me wrong, I believe that there are use cases for this, but if someone got their hands in your password_store, they would know every single login that you have (the only information that is protected is the password, or whatever is in the gpg file).
So, my question is, there is a password manager, cli based, that encrypts the whole database, and not the single entries?
Update: there is a pass extension made specifically to address this issue
I agree, but picture this: if someone get their hands in a kdbx database, they would need to brute force through the master password; they couldn’t possibly know any sites or logins. In the other hand, if someone got your password store, and you used this hierarchy structure, they could try to attack directly the logins, which increases the attack surface. That being said, yes, I completely agree with your last statement.
edit. For example, if you want to host the password database in a host service not owned by yourself, pass is entirely out of question in this case. A kbdx database, however, would offer a good deal of privacy
The
.passfile is encrypted just like the kbdx database and is also protected by a password. Apples to apples its the same amount of security.OP is talking about hhe meta-structure being visible.
If my filesystem gets compromised (stolen, confiscated, etc.) and I use pass, the infiltrators will know that I have a password that I labeled “slrpnk.net”. They won’t have access to the password itself, but they’ll be able to determine all the services I have accounts at.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_through_obscurity
That’s a non-sequitur.
How is encrypting the metadata, as well as the data security through obscurity? O.o
Because if the data is secure, it makes no difference if a bad actor knows you have an account with a service or not. In the same way, I’m sure I could scrape lemmy for usernames and assume those usernames are emails, but that doesn’t mean your account is less secure for using your email prefix as your lemmy username.
This is an example of security through obscurity. Not even the usernames are exposed IIRC. It’s just the domain/service. Hell, I could guess that you have a gmail account. That doesn’t make your account less secure for me knowing that.
Bullshit. It’s not about the obvious services, but rather the ones that give more info about my profile.
If the police confiscates my PC because of e.g. piracy, they could nail me down if they also knew that I had an account at a darkweb marketplace, or that I am a member of an organization that’s deemed to be “terrorist”.
The only way to hide that info with pass is to give it a cryptic name which make it less obvious, what the account is actually for. That is both inconvenient and I would argue: also quite security of obscurity.
It is not. Security through obscurity relies on having a visible secret hidden somewhere where “no one would think to check”. That’s different than encrypting the whole meta-structure of your digital life.
Firstly, if the police confiscate your PC, they already know (and have proven to a judge) that you conduct illegal activity and likely already have enough to convict you of a crime. lol
Secondly, you can have an account at a private torrent tracker (or any website [exluding cp]) and there’s nothing anyone can do about it–because that’s not illegal… Torrenting isn’t illegal, either. Sharing copy written content is and they can’t prove that you’ve done that beyond a reasonable doubt simply because you have an account at a website.
These are exceptionally poor arguments.
Cops confiscate devices all the time without good reason lmao. It’s commonplace to seize devices on a person upon arrest. Judges also grant search warrants upon very little evidence too. Cops absolutely don’t need to “prove” anything to a judge to get a warrant; there is no standard of proof at all; it’s a standard of evidence, which is not the same thing as proof, and a low standard of evidence at that.
Not if it’s for securing evidence. That is only collected before the verdict/conviction. Otherwise, there wouldn’t be any need for a trial.
Also, your metadata can put others in jeopardy. If you’re busted for being an antifascist activist, who the police deems a “terrorist” and you’re also member of another activist group which up to then wasn’t in the sights of law enforcement, then you’re putting that other activist group’s members in danger.
That wasn’t my argument, though. You can criticise the circumstances that started my example premise, but the point still stands: having metadata that’s clearly visible can be dangerous, because it can give an attacker more information on you (depending on your threat model).
You’ve actually only attacked my examples, not my argument. My original point still stands: The type of accounts you have can be something you legitimately want/need to encrypt. Not only the credentials.