Also, like… who fucking cares? Take them down anyway. Let them lose their internet, and then find out exactly why. They should be informed about the services they’re paying for.

While Russian companies and individuals are not authorized to sell Starlink, a gray market has emerged, fueled by the high demand from military forces and private buyers.

The Post reviewed four of the many Russian sites offering direct sales for the “special military operation,” the Kremlin’s euphemism for the war. Most terminals are sold through Telegram and start their journey in the Moscow area, before being funneled to the front.

One site offers a terminal and connection fees starting at just above $1,000. Customer service is free, and each client receives recommendations “to minimize risks of blocking,” the page notes, with glowing video testimonials from soldiers.

“We have been using Starlink for about a month. No complaints, the speed is good,” one review said, showing a terminal covered in camouflage. “Technical support works great.”

“The internet is flying, the men are happy,” another said. “Gentlemen, I recommend!”

To activate a device, users need a foreign phone number, email address and bank account to pay the monthly subscription fee, prompting suppliers to seek out people willing to lend their identities. Users in “client support” Telegram chats say it is easy to buy and register Starlink kits abroad. Most are obtained in Europe and transported through the United Arab Emirates. One page warns not to activate the terminal in Russia.

One supplier advised that connections for devices bought in the European Union could be blocked after 90 days of usage, suggesting one solution is to register using Ukrainian details.

Hard to shut down

Starlink can both disable individual terminals based on their ID numbers and block areas from receiving a signal, a practice called “geofencing,” the Federal Communications Commission told a U.N. regulator this year.

One person familiar with Starlink said that the company is technically capable of identifying the location of active terminals based on their pings up to satellites, but that it can be challenging to discern the user in the “forward edge of the battle area,” where Ukrainian and Russian troops are operating.

Stacie Pettyjohn, defense program director for the Center for a New American Security, said the U.S. effort to curb Russia’s use “doesn’t seem like it’s been hugely effective,” partly because of the shifting front lines.

“Ukrainian forces are in Russia now. Where exactly are the front lines?” she said. “If there’s a line drawn as to where it works and where it doesn’t, you’re basically fixing the front lines where they are and preventing the Ukrainians from going on the offensive.”

Ukrainian troops, for their part, said they also had concerns over denying access in geographic regions because it may shut their own terminals down. As it is, the troops entering Russia as part of August’s incursion suddenly found their terminals not working because of the geographic restrictions.

Significantly, they soon found workarounds to get the Starlinks online again — probably the same methods Russians have deployed. Interrupting the software update process and tweaking GPS settings can get it working in Russia, said a Ukrainian drone pilot operating there.

There are other viable methods to control illegal terminals, said Todd Harrison, a senior fellow and space security expert at the American Enterprise Institute. One possibility, he said, is for Kyiv and Washington to collect terminal IDs and provide them to SpaceX, with direction to deny access to anything else.