Months?! Despite that, the article is a good read
This announcement is a geopolitical weapon that arrived immediately. It forces russia to consider a future where all kinds of things they deem relatively save right now suddenly become much less so. Its also a message to russia that more weapon systems are on their way and the West can see a future delivering them. Just this announcement alone will alter russian war plans.
- Does russia decided to throw their forces onto the front now to get larger gains before these weapons arrive?
- Does russia decided to hold back forces and move strategic assets outside of the possible range of these new weapons at the cost of battlefield gains and needed response time to Ukrainian counterattacks?
- Have the weapons already been delivered and the announcement is just for show to give the appearance of a gap of time?
In the future when/if the weapons arrive is the second geopolitical, and at that time, actual physical weapon.
yeah this also gives russians ample warning to move all of their actual intended targets just outside the range, like how they already did with aircraft
Armchair General here. When they moved their aircraft further back, Russia greatly reduced their range and ordnance options while increasing the time Ukraine had to prepare for the strikes. Similarly, Russia splitting up their stockpiles to reduce strike effectiveness will have a significant impact on Russia’s already-strained logistics network. That’s the same reason why a relatively low volume of ATACMS has had such a substantial impact on their ability to wage war.
right, so as far as i understand rn, russian air force does several things that suck balls for ukrainians:
a. starting two and half year ago, russian strategic bombers lobbed long range cruise missiles like kalibr, kh-22, repurposed anti-ship missiles and such at ukrainian powerplants and so on and so on. these things have really long range, and some were launched from places like caspian sea; these heavy and medium bombers sit at airbases far, far outside any of these missiles range, they stay well outside ukrainian air defense in air as well. i doubt this decision will change much in this regard
- for some considerable time now, russian close air support stays well outside of ukrainian surface to air missiles range by using glide bombs to deliver bombs to the frontline. ukrainians can’t target these cas missions with their own air force because their missiles lack range, and any of these are also armed with their own. this is where not announcing these missiles delivery, but just shipping them and dropping without warning would have greatest effect, i believe. ukrainians lack means to get rid of this aircraft; they do have drones that go far enough, but drones are slow and very shiny on radar, providing plenty of warning, so aircraft can scramble in time. proper cruise missiles and especially ballistic missiles are much faster so they could catch some of these still on the ground. this is what happened when i think like 30? of ka-52, atgm-armed helicopters, were destroyed on ground without warning in two atacms strikes one day apart. these things were important in stopping ukrainian armored attacks in the south, until these were burning in luhansk and berdyansk.
now instead of destroying large part of russian su-25s, su-34s, su-35s, mig-29s, mig-31, and other such aircraft, on the ground, without warning, with exactly these cruise missiles, americans blared to the whole world that they will deliver these things months away from now, so that now… what exactly? su-25 will pick up a little bit more wear on every cas mission? daily scheduled pulverizing of donbas villages will be delayed by some extra half an hour? extra warning is meaningless because ukrainians don’t have means to strike these aircraft when in air. it’s just part of logistics for the bomb that lands somewhere in kharkiv that a bit longer part of it happens on a bomber. nothing stops russians from using well-connected airbases with rail links to launch these strikes. americans just gave up very important, very permanent and immediately impactful effect for nothing
or, if you will, these might be fears of eScAlAtIoN because some of these targets might have been, potentially, maybe, nominally russian strategic bombers, as in part of their nuclear triad. not like it’s actually a big or important part of it. if anyone took this seriously, kursk incursion should make clear that all russian lines are complete bluff. for now, the most potent russian air defense asset is american policy on long range weapons
III. russian jets flying air defense sorties will have to be stationed at further airbases. this changes little, because all the difference is that now these jets will just take a bit more wear on every mission
this announcement is pure horseshit that only warned russians and did nothing else. surprise strike on some airfield would send even better message with immediate and permanent effect on the frontline, as russian aircraft production is wholly inadequate
In before:
Putin will first scream his head off and declare this is an escalation.
Then when he sees we do it anyway, he will claim it changes NOTHING!! We will destroy any weapons the west supply.
Then he will try to get more junk from North Korea and Iran, and send thousands more Russians to their death in Ukraine.Oh it might be different this time!
He now has the option of sending Russians to die in Ukraine or Russia!
It’s a huge privilege to die in the motherland. 🫡
The US is more concerned with slowly bleeding Russia rather than saving Ukrainian lives or helping them win this war.
I guess it’s better than doing nothing but the talk by leaders of “standing with Ukraine” is bullshit.
When I heard Tim Scott put this as plainly as you just did during a presidential debate I was equal parts shocked and horrified.
https://social.teci.world/objects/7d674571-5e4e-44df-a92e-3ba0f51d73de
That’s probably the only thing I agree with that guy on.
It seems cold but it makes sense and I can’t really blame USA for doing that.
Another aspect to consider is that by gradually increasing support, it blurs the moments when so-called ‘red lines’ are being crossed. If we had provided Ukraine with Western cruise missiles, tanks, and jets from the start of the conflict, and allowed them to strike into Russia proper, there would have been a legitimate risk of major escalation. Instead, by slowly ramping up support, it’s much harder for Russia to pinpoint a specific moment when a line was crossed.
This would be how the US and Russia have played their cold wars.
