yeah this also gives russians ample warning to move all of their actual intended targets just outside the range, like how they already did with aircraft
Armchair General here. When they moved their aircraft further back, Russia greatly reduced their range and ordnance options while increasing the time Ukraine had to prepare for the strikes. Similarly, Russia splitting up their stockpiles to reduce strike effectiveness will have a significant impact on Russia’s already-strained logistics network. That’s the same reason why a relatively low volume of ATACMS has had such a substantial impact on their ability to wage war.
right, so as far as i understand rn, russian air force does several things that suck balls for ukrainians:
a. starting two and half year ago, russian strategic bombers lobbed long range cruise missiles like kalibr, kh-22, repurposed anti-ship missiles and such at ukrainian powerplants and so on and so on. these things have really long range, and some were launched from places like caspian sea; these heavy and medium bombers sit at airbases far, far outside any of these missiles range, they stay well outside ukrainian air defense in air as well. i doubt this decision will change much in this regard
for some considerable time now, russian close air support stays well outside of ukrainian surface to air missiles range by using glide bombs to deliver bombs to the frontline. ukrainians can’t target these cas missions with their own air force because their missiles lack range, and any of these are also armed with their own. this is where not announcing these missiles delivery, but just shipping them and dropping without warning would have greatest effect, i believe. ukrainians lack means to get rid of this aircraft; they do have drones that go far enough, but drones are slow and very shiny on radar, providing plenty of warning, so aircraft can scramble in time. proper cruise missiles and especially ballistic missiles are much faster so they could catch some of these still on the ground. this is what happened when i think like 30? of ka-52, atgm-armed helicopters, were destroyed on ground without warning in two atacms strikes one day apart. these things were important in stopping ukrainian armored attacks in the south, until these were burning in luhansk and berdyansk.
now instead of destroying large part of russian su-25s, su-34s, su-35s, mig-29s, mig-31, and other such aircraft, on the ground, without warning, with exactly these cruise missiles, americans blared to the whole world that they will deliver these things months away from now, so that now… what exactly? su-25 will pick up a little bit more wear on every cas mission? daily scheduled pulverizing of donbas villages will be delayed by some extra half an hour? extra warning is meaningless because ukrainians don’t have means to strike these aircraft when in air. it’s just part of logistics for the bomb that lands somewhere in kharkiv that a bit longer part of it happens on a bomber. nothing stops russians from using well-connected airbases with rail links to launch these strikes. americans just gave up very important, very permanent and immediately impactful effect for nothing
or, if you will, these might be fears of eScAlAtIoN because some of these targets might have been, potentially, maybe, nominally russian strategic bombers, as in part of their nuclear triad. not like it’s actually a big or important part of it. if anyone took this seriously, kursk incursion should make clear that all russian lines are complete bluff. for now, the most potent russian air defense asset is american policy on long range weapons
III. russian jets flying air defense sorties will have to be stationed at further airbases. this changes little, because all the difference is that now these jets will just take a bit more wear on every mission
yeah this also gives russians ample warning to move all of their actual intended targets just outside the range, like how they already did with aircraft
Armchair General here. When they moved their aircraft further back, Russia greatly reduced their range and ordnance options while increasing the time Ukraine had to prepare for the strikes. Similarly, Russia splitting up their stockpiles to reduce strike effectiveness will have a significant impact on Russia’s already-strained logistics network. That’s the same reason why a relatively low volume of ATACMS has had such a substantial impact on their ability to wage war.
right, so as far as i understand rn, russian air force does several things that suck balls for ukrainians:
a. starting two and half year ago, russian strategic bombers lobbed long range cruise missiles like kalibr, kh-22, repurposed anti-ship missiles and such at ukrainian powerplants and so on and so on. these things have really long range, and some were launched from places like caspian sea; these heavy and medium bombers sit at airbases far, far outside any of these missiles range, they stay well outside ukrainian air defense in air as well. i doubt this decision will change much in this regard
now instead of destroying large part of russian su-25s, su-34s, su-35s, mig-29s, mig-31, and other such aircraft, on the ground, without warning, with exactly these cruise missiles, americans blared to the whole world that they will deliver these things months away from now, so that now… what exactly? su-25 will pick up a little bit more wear on every cas mission? daily scheduled pulverizing of donbas villages will be delayed by some extra half an hour? extra warning is meaningless because ukrainians don’t have means to strike these aircraft when in air. it’s just part of logistics for the bomb that lands somewhere in kharkiv that a bit longer part of it happens on a bomber. nothing stops russians from using well-connected airbases with rail links to launch these strikes. americans just gave up very important, very permanent and immediately impactful effect for nothing
or, if you will, these might be fears of eScAlAtIoN because some of these targets might have been, potentially, maybe, nominally russian strategic bombers, as in part of their nuclear triad. not like it’s actually a big or important part of it. if anyone took this seriously, kursk incursion should make clear that all russian lines are complete bluff. for now, the most potent russian air defense asset is american policy on long range weapons
III. russian jets flying air defense sorties will have to be stationed at further airbases. this changes little, because all the difference is that now these jets will just take a bit more wear on every mission