There is no point. They drag the social media CEOs in front of congress regularly, give them a stern talking-to, and then it’s back to business as usual.
The social media ones are usually the equivalent of the this meme, with congress being trump. Hell, basically anything involving technology from this century is the same scenario.
I think it’s anything involving wealth. They do it with the oil companies too. Bring them in, tell them what naughty boys they’ve been and let them go on with it.
Do we need compliance regulations on minimum testing infrastructure etc for kernel-level development so that dangerous bugs can’t be mistakenly released?
Kurtz has a history of this calibre of issue under their leadership (both at CrowdStrike and at McAfee); why does this keep happening under their leadership and what can we learn to instruct other orgs not to make the same mistakes (e.g. via CISA directives)?
I’m sure CrowdStrike is absolutely prepared to admit they fucked up. What’s the point of this?
Will we be bringing in every CTO/CIO that decided to implement CrowdStrike for a congressional hearing as well?
How about every CEO or board member that voted to hire the CTO that decided to implement CrowdStrike…?
There is no point. They drag the social media CEOs in front of congress regularly, give them a stern talking-to, and then it’s back to business as usual.
Yea, this is one of those “optics is the action” scenarios and it’s a stupid waste of our taxes.
The social media ones are usually the equivalent of the this meme, with congress being trump. Hell, basically anything involving technology from this century is the same scenario.
I think it’s anything involving wealth. They do it with the oil companies too. Bring them in, tell them what naughty boys they’ve been and let them go on with it.
I moreso meant the confused face of “what are you even asking me? That question doesn’t make sense!” For anything tech 😅
Two things come to mind:
Do we need compliance regulations on minimum testing infrastructure etc for kernel-level development so that dangerous bugs can’t be mistakenly released?
Kurtz has a history of this calibre of issue under their leadership (both at CrowdStrike and at McAfee); why does this keep happening under their leadership and what can we learn to instruct other orgs not to make the same mistakes (e.g. via CISA directives)?
I’d like to see a televised paddling. Pants down bend over closeup shot of face, let go of ankkes and another whack.
Be far more effective than fines.