• Tramort@programming.dev
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      6 months ago

      It is a super important detail, but it’s still unforgivable for an app that expects privacy to be part of its brand identity.

        • Tramort@programming.dev
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          6 months ago

          Agreed

          But you can’t have privacy without security, and any privacy brand must have security in their bones.

          • claudiop@lemmy.world
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            6 months ago

            You can’t encrypt anything without a key. This is the key. If it wasn’t in plaintext then it would be encrypted. Then you’d need a key for that. Where do you put it?

            Phone OSs have mechanisms to solve this. Desktop ones do not.

    • Evotech@lemmy.world
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      6 months ago

      No your don’t understand, you’re supposed to encrypt the keys.

      Then you encrypt that key

      And then that key

      Until it’s all encrypted /s

    • boredsquirrel@slrpnk.net
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      6 months ago

      opportunistic TPM integration would be nice.

      I.e. use the security chip of the device, if one is found. Otherwise use password.

      OR use a Nitrokey etc, which can act as a secure device to store these keys too.

      Take that, Windows. You dont need a builtin TPM if you can use a Nitrokey 3 with a secure element, externally.

  • mashbooq@lemmy.world
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    6 months ago

    This same “discovery” gets reported on once or twice a year; it’s starting to feel like a FUD campaign rather than actual research

    • potatopotato@sh.itjust.works
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      6 months ago

      Yeah but it really shouldn’t be that way. Just add a pin or something, it’s way too easy for people to just grab devices or install malware to leak keys. The current standard for security is that everything is encrypted at rest regardless of whole disk encryption.

      Signal is still better that most of the stuff out there but it’s not above well intentioned criticism

    • boredsquirrel@slrpnk.net
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      6 months ago

      Some way to encrypt the decryption key.

      This could also mean TPM + Pin. Or using a Nitrokey, externally, which stores the password to decrypt the decryption key.

      That is how user account unlocking (on GrapheneOS with Pixel phones) is done.

  • Joël de Bruijn@lemmy.ml
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    6 months ago

    While true I don’t get why this is long known and also news at the same time.

    For Signal Backup tools for example this isn’t a bug but a feature and the only way to make long term archival of chats possible.

  • eco_game@discuss.tchncs.de
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    6 months ago

    I just read the full article, and I’m not even that concerned about storing the key in plaintext. I find the possibility of copying the files, and then being able to run the same session simultaneously a lot scarier.

  • JoeyJoeJoeJr@lemmy.ml
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    6 months ago

    If your computer is compromised to the point someone can read the key, read words 2-5 again.

    This is FUD. Even if Signal encrypted the local data, at the point someone can run a process on your system, there’s nothing to stop the attacker from adding a modified version of the Signal app, updating your path, shortcuts, etc to point to the malicious version, and waiting for you to supply the pin/password. They can siphon the data off then.

    Anyone with actual need for concern should probably only be using their phone anyway, because it cuts your attack surface by half (more than half if you have multiple computers), and you can expect to be in possession/control of your phone at all times, vs a computer that is often left unattended.

  • Otter@lemmy.ca
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    6 months ago

    I’ve heard criticism of the desktop app before as well, maybe they’ll finally rework it?