The Software Manager app in Linux Mint 22 will deliver faster start-up times and introduce a significant security safeguard for search results. As you may
… these would be hidden by default. Is any of these applications dangerous or a security risk to the system / user?
Linux Mint:
Unverified Flatpaks represent a huge security risk.
I personally don’t like this. This is not really true and in worse case even misleading and giving a false sense of security. If an app represents a huge security risk, why in the first place is it allowed in the repository? Unverified does not mean its a security risk, this is their interpretation of it. Unverified simply means, it is not verified by the original author.
Create a fork of an app and verify your website with the fork in Flatpak. The system is already broken. Another point is, that lot of unverified apps are just normal apps, as this is the way applications are handled in Linux. We have the right to create alternative versions of the programs and the verification badge will show that. There is no point in hiding alternatives. By doing so, it undermines a reason why we use GPL and Open Source. And what about apps where the original author does not care, but was brought to Flatpak by a community member?
Flathub:
It’s similar failure to what Flathub does on their site too, but for another thing.
Potentially unsafe: Full file system read/write access; Can access some specific files
Even though LibreOffice is verified, it is marked as potentially unsafe application on Flathub.
The Flathub security rating is useful but too cautious (so many “false alarms” that people ignore it). It is completely independent from the verification though.
Mixing these up makes no sense.
But for sure, officially supported Libreoffice may be more secure than distro-packaged Libreoffice.
Is any of these applications dangerous or a security risk to the system / user?
Likely not more than Distro packages. They pull in dependencies, and code, just like any other app.
Flatpaks are too pain tolerant regarding EOL runtimes. These may have security risks, and many badly maintained apps are using them, and at least KDE Discover doesnt show a warning here.
Create a fork of an app and verify your website with the fork in Flatpak. The system is already broken
True
By doing so, it undermines a reason why we use GPL and Open Source.
Very good points. It is a good security practice to stay close to a trusted upstream though. Browsers for example may have delayed security patches.
And what about apps where the original author does not care, but was brought to Flatpak by a community member?
Same here, if the upstream tests the Flatpak BEFORE shipping the release, it will work and be fast. If they dont, they ship the update, the flatpak is updated some time after that, it may have an issue, the packagers may need to patch something, solve the issue upstream etc.
The thing is that packagers should join upstream, as only integrated packaging gives this inherent stability and speed.
This is not relevant in many scenarios though. Flatpaks allow to securely sandbox random apps, so they are very often more secure.
The Flathub security rating is useful but too cautious (so many “false alarms” that people ignore it). It is completely independent from the verification though.
Mixing these up makes no sense.
That’s right, but I had a point there. My point is, that even verified applications can be marked as insecure on Flathub. That means, unverified applications can be secure based on the standards the Flathub sets. This was my point that its independent and why the verification of source has nothing to do with security. If Linux Mint does hide unverified apps, because it thinks these are unsecure, then it should hide all the applications that are marked as a potential unsecure app; just like the unverified apps are potentially unsecure (just like any other verified app).
There are legacy apps that are always insecure with huge static filesystem permissions AND they are sometimes not well maintained i.e. they dont support the Flatpak.
It’s similar failure to what Flathub does on their site too
My understanding is that Mint is just following Flathub’s classification, so it would be identical…?
And (would need to verify when this version is released) some of those apps are available without Flatpacks anyway… (ie VLC for example), so I’d expect those to still be available
This assumes that distro packages would be more secure. Which are not “verified” most of the time, by design. And which are installed to the system, can do whatever they want.
A system package can edit /etc, autostart itself, write to all your devices and /home.
Flatpaks MAY do that, but these will have an “insecure” rating on Flathub. And they can still not write a lot of areas, for example other Flatpaks internal storage, even if they have home permission.
A system package can edit /etc, autostart itself, write to all your devices and /home.
Distro packages are not inherently more secure, but they are all controlled and packaged by the team who manages your operating system. So you trust them fully. Which you cant for arbitrary packages from Flatpak, similar to arbitrary packages from Google playstore on Android. That’s why those “unmanaged” Flatpaks need such a rights system. I’m not saying one is better than the other, just that you can’t limit the security value by just what the app is allowed to do (in my opinion).
Linux mint and Ubuntu both add the “universe” repo by default. That repo is basically community grade, and even used for official flavors which tells a lot about their reliability.
Same with Fedora. Everything outside of Workstation or the KDE Spin needs to be checked for maintenance carefully. There is lots of abandonware.
With Flatpak on the other hand too, and you can still use it as it can just use EOL runtimes even on a rolling distro…
Examples of unverified apps:
… these would be hidden by default. Is any of these applications dangerous or a security risk to the system / user?
Linux Mint:
I personally don’t like this. This is not really true and in worse case even misleading and giving a false sense of security. If an app represents a huge security risk, why in the first place is it allowed in the repository? Unverified does not mean its a security risk, this is their interpretation of it. Unverified simply means, it is not verified by the original author.
Create a fork of an app and verify your website with the fork in Flatpak. The system is already broken. Another point is, that lot of unverified apps are just normal apps, as this is the way applications are handled in Linux. We have the right to create alternative versions of the programs and the verification badge will show that. There is no point in hiding alternatives. By doing so, it undermines a reason why we use GPL and Open Source. And what about apps where the original author does not care, but was brought to Flatpak by a community member?
Flathub:
It’s similar failure to what Flathub does on their site too, but for another thing.
Even though LibreOffice is verified, it is marked as potentially unsafe application on Flathub.
The Flathub security rating is useful but too cautious (so many “false alarms” that people ignore it). It is completely independent from the verification though.
Mixing these up makes no sense.
But for sure, officially supported Libreoffice may be more secure than distro-packaged Libreoffice.
Likely not more than Distro packages. They pull in dependencies, and code, just like any other app.
Flatpaks are too pain tolerant regarding EOL runtimes. These may have security risks, and many badly maintained apps are using them, and at least KDE Discover doesnt show a warning here.
True
Very good points. It is a good security practice to stay close to a trusted upstream though. Browsers for example may have delayed security patches.
Same here, if the upstream tests the Flatpak BEFORE shipping the release, it will work and be fast. If they dont, they ship the update, the flatpak is updated some time after that, it may have an issue, the packagers may need to patch something, solve the issue upstream etc.
The thing is that packagers should join upstream, as only integrated packaging gives this inherent stability and speed.
This is not relevant in many scenarios though. Flatpaks allow to securely sandbox random apps, so they are very often more secure.
That’s right, but I had a point there. My point is, that even verified applications can be marked as insecure on Flathub. That means, unverified applications can be secure based on the standards the Flathub sets. This was my point that its independent and why the verification of source has nothing to do with security. If Linux Mint does hide unverified apps, because it thinks these are unsecure, then it should hide all the applications that are marked as a potential unsecure app; just like the unverified apps are potentially unsecure (just like any other verified app).
Hopefully this was not too confusing to read.
Yes, verification is very different from the security rating.
Poorly you can sort by subsets but not by the security rating.
There are legacy apps that are always insecure with huge static filesystem permissions AND they are sometimes not well maintained i.e. they dont support the Flatpak.
My understanding is that Mint is just following Flathub’s classification, so it would be identical…?
And (would need to verify when this version is released) some of those apps are available without Flatpacks anyway… (ie VLC for example), so I’d expect those to still be available
I don’t see this as a big issue…
This assumes that distro packages would be more secure. Which are not “verified” most of the time, by design. And which are installed to the system, can do whatever they want.
A system package can edit /etc, autostart itself, write to all your devices and /home.
Flatpaks MAY do that, but these will have an “insecure” rating on Flathub. And they can still not write a lot of areas, for example other Flatpaks internal storage, even if they have home permission.
Distro packages are not inherently more secure, but they are all controlled and packaged by the team who manages your operating system. So you trust them fully. Which you cant for arbitrary packages from Flatpak, similar to arbitrary packages from Google playstore on Android. That’s why those “unmanaged” Flatpaks need such a rights system. I’m not saying one is better than the other, just that you can’t limit the security value by just what the app is allowed to do (in my opinion).
Linux mint and Ubuntu both add the “universe” repo by default. That repo is basically community grade, and even used for official flavors which tells a lot about their reliability.
Same with Fedora. Everything outside of Workstation or the KDE Spin needs to be checked for maintenance carefully. There is lots of abandonware.
With Flatpak on the other hand too, and you can still use it as it can just use EOL runtimes even on a rolling distro…